Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive de nitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with in nite-state systems. Proofs are generated using Isabelle/HOL. The human e ort required to analyze a protocol can be as little as a week or two, yielding a proof script that takes a few minutes to run.
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Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are intended to let agents communicate securely over an insecure network. An obvious security goal is secrecy: a spy cannot read the contents of messages intended for others. Also important is authenticity: if a message appears to be from Alice, then Alice sent precisely that message, and any nonces or timestamps within it give a correct indication of its freshness. This paper will not discuss denial of service.
A typical protocol allows A to make contact with B, delivering a key to both parties for their exclusive use. They may involve as few as two messages, but are surprisingly hard to get right. One problem is the combinatorial complexity of the messages that an intruder could generate. A quite di erent problem is to specify precisely what properties the protocol is intended to achieve. Anderson Belief logics formalize what an agent may infer from messages received. The original BAN logic 10] allows short, abstract proofs. It has identi ed some protocol aws but missed others. New belief logics 28] address some weaknesses of BAN but sacri ce its simplicity.
We can fruitfully borrow from both approaches: from the rst, a concrete notion of events, such as A sending X to B; from the second, the idea of deriving guarantees from each message. Protocols are formalized as the set of all possible traces, which are lists of events such as`A sends X to B.' An agent may extend a trace in any way permitted by the protocol, given what he can see in the current trace. Agents do not know the true sender of a message and may forward items that they cannot read. One agent is an active attacker.
Properties are proved by induction on traces, using the theorem prover Isabelle 32] . Analyzing a new protocol requires several days' e ort, while exploring the e ects of a change to an existing protocol often takes just a few hours. Laws and proof techniques developed for one protocol are often applicable generally.
The approach is oriented around proving guarantees, but their absence can indicate possible attacks. In this way, I have discovered an attack on the variant of the Otway-Rees protocol suggested by Burrows et al. 10, page 247] . (At the time, I was unaware of Mao and Boyd's earlier attack 28].) Even if no attacks are found, the structure of the proof yields insights into the protocol.
The paper goes on to describe the method, rst in overview (x2) and then in some detail (x3). Three protocols are then analyzed. Otway-Rees illustrates the shared-key model (x4); Needham-Schroeder illustrates the publickey model (x5); the recursive authentication protocol 9] demonstrates how to deal with n-way authentication (x6). Related work is discussed (x7) and conclusions given (x8).
Overview of the Inductive Method
Informal arguments for a protocol's correctness are conducted in terms of what could or could not happen. Here is a hypothetical dialogue:
Salesman. At the end of a run, only Alice and Bob can possibly know the session key Kab. Customer. What about an eavesdropper? Salesman. He can't read the certi cates without Alice or Bob's long-term keys, which he can't get. Customer. Could an attacker trick Bob into accepting a key shared with himself? Salesman. The use of identifying nonces prevents that. The customer may nd such arguments unconvincing, but they can be made rigorous. The necessary formal tool is the inductive de nition 2]. Each inductive de nition lists the possible actions that an agent or system can perform. The corresponding induction rule lets us reason about the consequences of an arbitrary nite sequence of such actions. Induction has long been used to specify the semantics of programming languages 20] ; it copes well with nondeterminism. (Plotkin conceived this application of inductive de nitions, while Huet pioneered their use in proof tools.)
For security protocols, the model must specify the capabilities of an attacker. Several inductively-de ned operators are useful. One (parts) merely returns all the components of a set of messages. Another (analz) models the decryption of past tra c using available keys. Another (synth) models the forging of messages. The attacker is speci ed|independently of the protocol!|in terms of analz and synth. Algebraic laws governing parts, analz and synth have been proved by induction and are invaluable for reasoning about protocols.
The inductive protocol de nition models the behaviour of honest agents faithfully executing protocol steps in the presence of the attacker. It can even model carelessness, such as agents accidentally revealing secrets. The inherent nondeterminism models the possibility of an agent's being unavailable.
Belief logics allow short proofs; the main reason for mechanizing them 7] is to eliminate human error. In contrast, inductive veri cation of protocols involves long and detailed proofs. Each safety property is proved by induction over the protocol. Each case considers a state of the system that might be reached by the corresponding protocol step. Simplifying the safety property for that case may reveal a combination of circumstances leading to its violation. Only if all cases are covered has the property been proved. Our spy is accepted by the others as an honest agent. He may send normal protocol messages using his own long-term secret key, as well as sending fraudulent messages. This combination lets him participate in protocol runs using intercepted keys, thereby impersonating other agents.
The spy is powerful, but he is the same in all protocols. A common body of laws and tactics (mechanical proof procedures) is available. A tactic often proves the spy's case of the induction automatically.
Modelling a Protocol
Most events in a trace have the form Says A B X, which means`A sends message X to B.' Another possible event is Notes There is a fth, implicit, step, in which A checks her nonce and con rms the session. Implicit steps can be modelled, if necessary. For Otway-Rees, it su ces to prove authenticity of the certi cate that A receives in step 4.
For TLS 15, 35] , the model includes a rule for session con rmation in order to support the resumption of past sessions.
We cannot assume that a message sent in step i will be received. But we can identify the sending of a message in step i + 1 with the receipt of a satisfactory message in step i. Because the model never forces agents to act, there will be traces in which A sends X to B but B never responds. We may interpret such traces as indicating that X was intercepted, B rejected X, or B was down.
An agent may participate in several protocol runs concurrently; the trace represents his state in all those runs. He may respond to past events, no matter how old they are. He may respond any number of times, or never. If the protocol is safe even under these liberal conditions, then it will remain safe when time-outs and other checks are added. Letting agents respond only to the most recent message would prevent modelling middle-person attacks. Excluding some traces as ill-formed weakens theorems proved about all traces.
Standard Rules
A protocol description usually requires three additional rules. One is obvious: the empty list, ], is a trace. Two other rules model fake messages and accidents.
If evs is a trace, X 2 synth(analz H) is a fraudulent message and B 6 = Spy, then evs may be extended with the event Says Spy B X: Here H contains all messages in the past trace. It includes the spy's initial state, which holds the long-term keys of an arbitrary set of`bad' agents. The spy may say anything he plausibly could say and can masquerade as any of the bad agents.
The TLS protocol 15] arrives at session keys by exchanging nonces and applying a pseudo-random-number function. I have modelled TLS 35] by assuming this function to be an arbitrary injection. In the protocol specication, agents apply the random-number function when necessary. The spy has an additional rule that allows him to apply the function to any message items at his disposal. Other protocols in which keys are computed will require an analogous rule.
If evs is a trace and S distributed the session key K in a run involving the nonces Na and Nb, then evs may be extended with the event This strange-looking rule, the Oops rule, models the loss (by any means) of session keys. We need an assurance that lost keys cannot compromise future runs. The Oops message includes nonces in order to identify the protocol run, distinguishing between recent and past losses.
For some protocols, such as Yahalom, the Oops rule brings hidden properties to light 36]. For others, it is not clear whether Oops can be expressed at all.
Induction
The speci cation de nes the set of possible traces inductively: it is the least set closed under the given rules. To appreciate what this means, it may be helpful to recall that the set N of natural numbers is inductively de ned by the rules 0 2 N and n 2 N =) Suc n 2 N.
For reasoning about an inductively de ned set, we may use the corresponding induction principle. For the set N, it is the usual mathematical induction: to prove P(n) for each natural number n, prove P(0) and prove P(x) =) P(Suc x) for each x 2 N. For the set of traces, the induction principle says that P(evs) holds for each trace evs provided P is preserved under all the rules for creating traces.
We must prove P ] to cover the empty trace. For each of the other rules, we must prove an assertion of the form P(evs) =) P(ev#evs), where event ev contains the new message. (Here ev#evs is the trace that extends evs with event ev: new events are added to the front of a trace.) The rule may resemble list induction, but the latter considers all conceivable messages, not just those allowed by the protocol.
A trivial example of induction is to prove that no agent sends a message to himself: no trace contains an event of the form Says A A X. This holds vacuously for the empty trace, and the other rules specify conditions such as B 6 = S to prevent the creation of such events.
Regularity Lemmas
These lemmas concern occurrences of a particular item X as a possible message component. Such theorems have the form X 2 parts H ?! , where H is the set of all messages available to the spy. These are strong results: they hold in spite of anything that the spy might do. For most protocols, it is easy to prove that the spy never gets hold of any agent's long-term key, excluding the bad agents. The inductive proof amounts to examining the protocol rules and observing that none of them involve sending long-term keys. The spy cannot send any either because, by the induction hypothesis, he has none at his disposal except those of the bad agents.
Unicity results state that nonces or session keys identify certain messages. Naturally we expect the server never to re-issue session keys, or agents their nonces. If they choose these items to be fresh, then it is straightforward to prove that the key (or nonce) part of a message determines the values of the other parts.
Secrecy Theorems
Regularity lemmas are easy to prove because they are stated in terms of the parts operator. Secrecy cannot be so expressed; if X is a secret then some agents can see X and others cannot. Secrecy theorems are, instead, stated in terms of analz. Their proofs can be long and di cult, typically splitting into cases on whether or not certain keys are compromised.
A typical result involving analz states that if the spy holds some session keys, he cannot use them to reveal others. It would su ce to prove that nobody sends messages of the form Crypt Kab fj: : : Kcd : : :j g, but this claim is false: the spy can send such messages and make other agents send them. Fortunately, he does not thereby learn new session keys; to work such mischief, he must already possess Kcd. The discussion above suggests the precise form of the theorem. If K can be obtained with the help of a session key K 0 and previous tra c, then either K = K 0 or K can be obtained from the tra c alone. Because some protocol steps introduce new keys, proof by induction seems to require strengthening the formula, generalizing K 0 to a set of session keys. This is the session key compromise theorem.
Proving a theorem of this form is often the hardest task in analyzing a protocol. A huge case analysis often results. While it can be automated, the processor time required seems to be exponential in the number of di erent keys used for encryption in any single protocol message. A bit of creativity here can yield substantial savings; see x6.4 below. For simple key-exchange protocols, however, essentially the same six-command proof script always seems to work.
The theorem makes explicit something we may have taken for granted: that no agent should use session keys to encrypt other keys (see also Gollmann 17, x2.1]). A generalization of the theorem can be used to prove the secrecy of B's nonce in Yahalom 36] .
The session key secrecy theorem states that if the server distributes a session key Kab to A and B, then the spy never gets this key. Since the spy is treated in every respect as an honest agent, we may conclude that no other agent gets the key either, even by accident.
The theorem stipulates that A and B are uncompromised and that no Oops message has given the session key to the spy. If we must forbid all Oops messages for Kab, not just those involving the current nonces, then we should consider whether the protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack.
Secrecy properties can usually be proved using six or seven commands. A constant problem in secrecy proofs is being presented with gigantic formulas. We need to discard just the right amount of information and think carefully about how induction formulas are expressed.
Finding Attacks
Secrecy is necessary but not su cient for correctness. The server might be distributing the key to the wrong pair of agents. When A receives message 4 of the Otway-Rees protocol, can she be sure it really came from B, who got it from S? For the simpli ed version of the protocol outlined above (x2.4), the answer is no.
The only secure part of message 4 is its encrypted part, fjNa; Kabj g Ka .
But it need not have originated as the rst encrypted part of message 3. It could as well have originated as the second part, if S received a fraudulent message 2 in which a previous Na had been substituted for Nb.
The machine proof leads us to consider a scenario in which Na is used in two roles. It is then easy to invent an attack. A spy, C, intercepts A's message 1 and records Na. He masquerades rst as A (indicated as C A below), causing the server to issue him a session key Kca and also to package Na with this key. He then masquerades as B. Otway-Rees uses nonces not just to assure freshness, but for binding: to identify the principals 1]. Verifying the binding complicates the formal proofs. One can prove|for the corrected protocol|that Na and Nb uniquely identify the messages they originate in and never coincide. Then we can prove guarantees for both agents: if they receive the expected messages, and the nonces agree, then the server really did distribute the session key to the intended parties.
A Mechanized Theory of Messages
The approach has been mechanized using Isabelle/HOL, an instantiation of the generic theorem prover Isabelle 32, 37] to higher-order logic. Isabelle is appropriate because of its support for inductively de ned sets and its automatic tools. Some Isabelle syntax appears below in order to convey a feel for how proofs are conducted.
The methodology is tailored to Isabelle and makes heavy use of its classical reasoner 34]. However, it can probably be modi ed to suit other higherorder logic provers such as PVS 31] or HOL 18] . At a minimum, the prover should provide a simpli er that takes conditional rewrite rules and that can perform automatic case splits for if-then-else expressions. Unless some form of set theory is available, the algebraic laws for parts, analz and synth will be lost. HOL predicates make satisfactory sets, but nite lists do not.
Isabelle/HOL has a polymorphic type system resembling ML's 33]. An item of type agent can never appear where something of type msg is expected. Type inference eliminates the need to specify types in expressions. Laws about lists, sets, etc., are polymorphic; the rewriter uses the appropriate types automatically.
Agents and Messages
There are three kinds of agents: the server S, the friendly agents, and the spy. Friendly agents have the form Friend i, where i is a natural number. Given such a de nition, Isabelle de nes an appropriate xedpoint and proves the desired rules. These include the introduction rules (those that constitute the de nition itself) as well as case analysis and induction.
The de nition of parts does not make X a part of Hash X even though it is a part of Crypt KX. There is no inconsistency here: for typical protocols, private keys might be included in hashes (where they serve as signatures) but never in encrypted messages. We can prove that uncompromised private keys are not part of any tra c, and use this basic lemma to prove deeper properties.
Derived Laws Governing the Operators
Section 2.2 presented a few of the laws proved for the operators, but protocol veri cation requires many more. Let us examine them systematically. All have been mechanically proved from the preceding de nitions. Nested encryptions give rise to nested if-then-else expressions. Sometimes we know whether the relevant key is secure, but letting automatic tools generate a full case analysis gives us short proof scripts. Impossible cases are removed quickly. Redundant case analyses|those that simplify to`if P then Q else Q'|can be simpli ed to Q. The resulting expression might be enormous, but symbolic evaluation at least expresses analz(fXg H) in terms of analz H, which should let us invoke the induction hypothesis.
Rewriting by the following rule, which is related to idempotence, simpli es the cases that arise when an agent forwards to another agent some message that is visible in previous tra c. X Otway-Rees assumes a symmetric-key environment. Every agent A has a long-term key, shrK A, shared with the server. The spy has such a key (shrK Spy) and there is even the redundant shrK S. Function initState speci es agents' initial knowledge. The spy knows the long-term keys of the agents in the set bad. The function spies models the set of messages the spy can see in a trace. He sees all messages sent across the network. He even sees the internal notes of the bad agents, who can be regarded as being under his control. 4 A Shared-Key Protocol: Otway-Rees Section 2.4 discussed the modelling of a protocol informally, though in detail. Now, let us consider the speci cation supplied to the theorem prover (Fig. 1) .
The identi ers at the far left name the rules: Nil for the empty trace, Fake for fraudulent messages, OR1{4 for protocol steps, and Oops for the accidental loss of a session key. The set of traces is the constant otway.
The Nil rule is trivial, so let us examine Fake. The condition evs 2 otway states that evs is an existing trace. Now X 2 synth(analz(spies evs)) denotes any message that could be forged from what the spy could decrypt from the trace; recall that he holds the bad agents' private keys. The spy can send forged messages to any other agent B, including the server. All rules have additional conditions, here B 6 = Spy, to ensure that agents send no messages to themselves; this trivial fact eliminates some impossible cases in proofs.
Rule OR1 formalizes step 1 of Otway-Rees. List evs1 is the current trace. (Calling it evs1 instead of simply evs tells the user which subgoals have arisen from this rule during an inductive proof, even after case-splitting, .) The nonce Na must be fresh: not contained in used evs1. An agent has no sure means of generating fresh nonces, but can do so with a high probability by choosing enough random bytes.
In rule OR2, set evs2 denotes the set of all events, stripped of their temporal order. Agent B responds to a past message, no matter how old it is. We could restrict the rule to ensure that B never responds to a given message more than once. Current proofs do not require this restriction, however, and it might prevent the detection of replay attacks.
There is nothing else in the rules that was not already discussed in x2.4
above. Translating informal protocol notation into Isabelle format is perhaps su ciently straightforward to be automated.
Proving Possibility Properties
The rst theorems to prove of any protocol description are some possibility properties. These do not assure liveness, merely that message formats agree from one step to the next. We cannot prove that anything must happen; agents are never forced to act. But if the protocol can never proceed from the rst message to the last, then it must have been transcribed incorrectly.
Here is a possibility property for Otway-Rees. For all agents A and B, distinct from themselves and from the server, there is a key K, nonce N and a trace such that the nal message B ! A : Na; fjNa; Kabj g Ka is sent. This theorem is proved by joining up the protocol rules in order and showing that all their preconditions can be met.
Proving Forwarding Lemmas
Some results are proved for reasoning about steps in which an agent forwards an unknown item. Here is a rule for OR2: Says A 0 B fjN; Agent A; Agent B; Xj g 2 set evs X 2 analz(spies evs) The proof is trivial. The spy sees the whole of the message; since X is transmitted in clear, analz will nd it. The spy can learn nothing new by seeing X again when B responds to this message.
Sometimes the forwarding party removes a layer of encryption, perhaps revealing something to the spy. Then the forwarding lemma is weaker: it is stated using parts instead of analz, and is useful only for those theorems (`regularity lemmas') that can be stated using parts. Otway-Rees has no nested encryption, but the Oops rule removes a layer of encryption: it takes K from the server's message and gives it to the spy. Its forwarding lemma states that this act does not add new keys to parts(spies evs).
Says S B fjNa; X; Crypt K 0 fjNb; Kj gj g 2 set evs K 2 parts(spies evs)
Proving Regularity Lemmas
Statements of the form X 2 parts(spies evs) ?! impose conditions on the appearance of X in any message. Many such lemmas can be proved in the same way.
1. Apply induction, generating cases for each protocol step and Nil, Fake, Oops. 2. For each step that forwards part of a message, apply the corresponding forwarding lemma, using analz H parts H if needed to express the conclusion in terms of parts. 3. Prove the trivial Nil case using a standard automatic tactic. 4. Simplify all remaining cases.
In Isabelle (or any programmable tool), the user can de ne a tactic to perform these tasks and return any remaining subgoals. Usually, the Fake case can then be proved automatically.
A basic regularity law states that secret keys remain secret. If evs 2 otway (meaning, evs is a trace) then Key(shrK A) 2 parts(spies evs) () A 2 bad :
Two commands generate the proof.
Proving Unicity Theorems
Fresh session keys and nonces uniquely identify their message of origin. But we must exclude the possibility of spoof messages, and this can be done in two di erent ways. In the case of session keys, a typical formulation refers to an event and names the server as the sender (for evs 2 otway): 9B 0 Na 0 Nb 0 X 0 : 8B Na Nb X: Says S B fjNa; X; Crypt(shrK B)fjNb; Kj gj g 2 set evs ?! B = B 0^N a = Na 0^N b = Nb 0^X = X 0 : The free occurrence of K in the event uniquely determines the other four components shown. To apply such a theorem requires proof that the message in question really originated with the server.
An alternative formulation, here for nonces, presumes the existence of a message encrypted with a secure key: 9B 0 : 8B: Crypt(shrK A)fjNa; Agent A; Agent Bj g 2 parts(spies evs)
?! B = B 0 :
Here evs is some trace and, crucially, A 6 2 bad. The spy could not have performed the encryption because he lacks A's key. The free occurrence of Na in the message determines the identity of B.
As in the BAN logic, we obtain guarantees from encryption by keys known to be secret. However, such guarantees are not built into the logic: they are proved. Both formulations of unicity may be regarded as regularity lemmas. Their proofs are not hard to generate.
Proving Secrecy Theorems
Section 2.8 discussed the session key compromise theorem. If K can be obtained from a set of session keys and messages, then either it is one of those keys, or it can be obtained from the messages alone. The theorem is formulated as follows, for an arbitrary trace evs (evs 2 otway). K 2 analz(K spies evs)) () K 2 K _ K 2 analz(spies evs)
Here K is an arbitrary set of session keys, not necessarily present in the trace. The right hand side of the equivalence is a simpli cation of K 2 K analz(spies evs) Replacing analz by parts, which distributes over union, would render the theorem trivial. The right-to-left direction is trivial anyway.
To prove such a theorem can be a daunting task. However, there are techniques that make proving secrecy theorems almost routine.
Apply induction.
2. For each step that forwards part of a message, apply the corresponding forwarding lemma, if its conclusion is expressed in terms of analz.
3. Simplify all cases, using rewrite rules to evaluate analz symbolically: pulling out agent names, nonces and compound messages and performing automatic case splits on encrypted messages.
The Fake case usually survives, but it can be proved by a standard argument involving the properties of synth and analz. This argument can be programmed as a tactic, which works for all protocols investigated. For the session key compromise theorem, no further e ort is needed. Other secrecy theorems require a detailed argument. Chief among these is proving that nonce Nb of the Yahalom protocol 10] remains secret, which requires establishing a correspondence between nonces and keys 36].
Proving the Session Key Secrecy Theorem
This theorem states that the protocol is correct from the server's viewpoint. Suppose also that the key is not lost in an Oops event involving the same nonces:
Notes Spy fjNa; Nb; Kj g 6 2 set evs Then we have K 6 2 analz(spies evs); the key is never available to the spy. This secrecy theorem is slightly harder to prove than the previous one. In the step 3 case, there are two possibilities. If the new message is the very one mentioned in the theorem statement then the session key is not fresh, contradiction; otherwise, the induction hypothesis yields the needed result. Isabelle can prove the step 3 case automatically. The Oops case is also nontrivial; showing that any Oops message involving K must also involve Na and Nb requires unicity of session keys, a theorem discussed in the previous section. The full proof script consists of seven commands and executes in eight seconds, generating a proof of over 4000 steps. 2 
Proving Authenticity Guarantees
The session key secrecy theorem described above is worthless on its own. It holds of a protocol variant that can be attacked (x2.9). In the correct protocol, if A or B receive the expected nonce, then the server has sent message 3 in precisely the right form. Agents need guarantees (subject to conditions they can check) con rming that their certi cates are authentic.
Proving such guarantees for A and B completes the security argument, via an appeal to the session key secrecy theorem.
The correct protocol di ers in message 2, which now encrypts Nb: One might argue that this is no attack at all. An agent who is careless enough to talk to the enemy cannot expect any guarantees. The mechanized analysis presented below reveals that the protocol's guarantees for A are adequate. However, those for B are not: they rely upon A's being careful, which is a stronger assumption than mere honesty. Moreover, the attack can also occur if A talks to an honest agent whose private key has been compromised. Lowe suggests a simple x that provides good guarantees for both A and B.
Modelling the Protocol
In the public-key model, an agent A has a public key pubK A, known to all agents, and a private key priK A. The spy knows the bad agents' private keys. No private key coincides with any public key. In other respects, the model resembles the shared-key one described above (x3.5).
Let us start with the original, awed, Needham-Schroeder. Figure 2 presents the inductive de nition. There are ve rules: three for the protocol steps and two standard ones, identical to those in Fig. 1 . There is no Oops message because the protocol does not distribute session keys. However, one could ask|as has Meadows 29] |what might happen if one of the nonces is compromised.
More precisely, the protocol steps are as follows:
1. If, in the current trace, Na is a fresh nonce and B is an agent distinct from A, then we may add the event Says A B (Crypt(pubK B)fjNa; Aj g): 
Proving Guarantees for A
The guarantees for A are that her nonce remains secret|from the spy|and that B is present. The latter follows from the former, for if the spy does not know Na then he could not have sent message 2. The proofs require, as lemmas, unicity properties for Na saying that Na is only used once.
No value is ever used both as Na and as Nb, even in separate runs.
In any message of the form Crypt(pubK B)fjNa; Aj g, the value of nonce Na uniquely determines the agents A and B, over all tra c.
Both lemmas assume Na to be secret and form part of an inductive proof that Na really is secret. They hold because honest agents are speci ed to choose unpredictable nonces with a negligible probability of collision.
The guarantee for A after step 2 is that the message indeed originated with B, provided it contains the expected nonce. The guarantee is consistent with Lowe's attack because, as always, it considers runs between two uncompromised principals. If A runs the protocol with the spy then her guarantee is void. Lowe himself found no problem with the protocol from A's viewpoint 24, x3.2]; his attack concerns the guarantee for B.
Proving Guarantees for B
The situation as seen by B is almost symmetrical to that seen by A. Proving by induction that Nb remains secret would authenticate A. Most of the Isabelle proof scripts for A's theorems also work for B with trivial alterations.
It is easy to prove that, if Nb is secret, then its value in any message of the form Crypt(pubK A)fjNa; Nbj g uniquely determines A and Na.
Unfortunately, Nb does not remain secret. The attempt to prove its secrecy fails, leaving a subgoal that contains (as a past event) A's sending message 1 to a compromised agent. The subgoal describes a consistent set of circumstances: Lowe's attack. Details appear in x5.5 below.
Weaker properties can be proved. If A never sends Nb to anybody in step 3 of the protocol, then Nb remains secret. In consequence, if B receives Nb in step 3 then A has sent it, and is therefore present. However, A may have sent it to anybody.
The proof follows the usual argument (based on A's proofs), but assumes that A says no messages of the form Crypt(pubK C)Nb for any C. With this additional assumption, Nb does remain secret; it then follows that if B sends Crypt(pubK A)fjNa; Nbj g as step 2 and receives Crypt(pubK B)Nb, then this reply came from A. Since this conclusion contradicts the assumption, B cannot receive Crypt(pubK B)Nb.
The result above has the form :Q implies :P, which is equivalent to P implies Q. If B does receive Crypt(pubK B)Nb, then A has indeed sent the message Crypt(pubK C)Nb for some C.
This example suggests a general strategy to prove that decrypting a message of the form Crypt(pubK A)X indicates A's presence. Prove that if A never performs the step in which that message is decrypted, then some The nonces are broadcast to the world, but the signatures obviously assure A and B of the other's presence.
A Glimpse at the Machine Proofs
To give an impression of the Isabelle formalization, Fig. 3 presents the theorems providing guarantees for A. They are numbered as follows.
1. This unicity lemma states that Na (if secret) is not also used as Nb. It is proved by induction.
2. This unicity lemma states that, if Na is secret, then its appearance in any instance of message 1 determines the other components. It too follows by induction, with a standard proof script.
3. This corollary of the previous lemma has a trivial proof. These unicity lemmas refer to the presence of encrypted messages anywhere in past tra c. The remaining theorems refer to events of the form Says A B X involving such encrypted messages.
4. This crucial theorem guarantees the secrecy of Na. The conditions A 6 2 bad and B 6 2 bad express that both A and B are uncompromised.
The proof is by induction; it relies on the previous three lemmas, which assume the secrecy of Na as an induction hypothesis.
5. This theorem is A's nal guarantee. If A has used Na to start a run with B and receives the message Crypt(pubK A)fjNa; Nbj g, then B has sent that message. It is subject to both agents' being uncompromised. The proof is by induction and relies on the secrecy and unicity of Na.
The proof script for all ve theorems comprises 27 commands (tactic invocations) and executes in ten seconds, or two seconds per theorem.
What about the guarantees for B? Attempting to prove the secrecy of Nb leads to a subgoal that appears to have no proof. This situation might arise when the last event is an instance of step 3, as we can tell because the trace is called evs3. Agents A and B are uncompromised and A has used Na to start a run with a compromised agent, C. Somebody has sent the message Crypt(pubK A)fjNa; Nbj g. We must show that these circumstances are contradictory, since the conclusion is just False. The conclusion is the simpli ed form of the claim that Nb remains secret even after A has sent the step 3 message Crypt(pubK C)fjNbj g, but this message reveals Nb to the spy. Such proof states can be hard to interpret. Does the induction formula require strengthening? Must additional lemmas be proved? But, in this case, we easily recognize Lowe's attack. The assumptions describe events that could actually occur: Nb need not remain secret. Lowe 24] The previous proof scripts, by and large, still work for this version. Thanks to Isabelle's high level of automation, minor changes such as that above seldom interfere with existing proofs. The guarantees for A are proved precisely as before.
Analyzing the Strengthened Protocol
In proving guarantees for B, we naturally seek to strengthen them. The unicity property for Nb states that, if Nb is secret, then its presence in step 2 uniquely determines all other message components (recall x5.4). Step First, A contacts B. If B then contacts the authentication server then the run resembles Otway-Rees. But B may choose to contact some other agent C, and so forth; a chain of arbitrary length may form. During each such round, an agent adds its name and a fresh nonce to an ever-growing request message.
For the sake of discussion, suppose that C does not extend the chain but instead contacts the authentication server. The server generates fresh session keys Kab and Kbc|in the general case, one key for each pair of agents adjacent in the chain. It encloses each session key in two certi cates, Even which properties to prove are not obvious. One might simplify the protocol to distribute a single session key, common to all the agents in the chain. But then, security between A and B would depend upon the honesty of C, an agent possibly not known to A. There may be applications where such a weak guarantee might be acceptable, but it seems better to give a separate session key to each adjacent pair.
I have proved a general guarantee for each participant. If it receives a certi cate containing a session key and the name of another agent, then the spy will never know the key. The Isabelle proofs are modest in scale. Fewer than 30 results are proved, using under 130 commands; they run in about three minutes.
The Recursive Authentication Protocol
The protocol was invented by John Bull of APM Ltd. In the description below, let Hash X be the hash of X and Hash X Y the pair fjHashfjX; Y j g; Y j g. Typically, X is an agent's long-term shared key and HashfjX; Y j g is a message digest, enabling the server to check that Y originated with that agent. Step 2 may be repeated as many times as desired. Each time, new components are added to the message and a new message digest is pre xed. The recursion terminates when some agent performs step 2 with the server as the destination.
In The description above describes a special case: a protocol run with three clients. The conventional protocol notation cannot cope with arbitrary numbers of participants, let alone recursive processing of nested messages. Section x6.3 below will specify the protocol as an inductive de nition. The dummy session key Kcs avoids having to treat the last agent as a special case. All agents except the rst take two certi cates. An implementation can safely omit the dummy certi cate. Removing information from the system makes less information available to an intruder.
The original protocol implements encryption using exclusive-or (XOR) and hashing. For veri cation purposes, encryption should be taken as primitive. Correctness of the protocol does not depend upon the precise form of encryption, provided it is implemented properly; the original use of XOR was awed (see x6.6).
Protocol certi cates are accompanied by agent names sent in clear. It is safe to simplify the speci cation by omitting these names. For the most part, the protocol is modelled just like the xed-length protocols discussed above. Figure 5 presents the inductive de nition. The rules for the empty trace and the spy are standard. The other rules can be paraphrased as follows: The speci cation actually omits the equation de ning Pa. It appears to be unnecessary, and its omission simpli es the proofs. They therefore hold of a weaker protocol in which any agent may react to any message by sending an instance of step 2. Ill-formed requests may result, but the server will ignore them. of Nb he used, and forwards the remaining certi cates (R). The nal step of the protocol is the initiator's acceptance of the last certi cate, Crypt(shrK A)fjKab; B; Naj g. This implicit step need not be modelled; all certi cates will be proved to be authentic.
Modelling the Protocol
There is no Oops message (recall x2.5). It cannot easily be expressed for the recursive authentication protocol because a key never appears together with both its nonces. The spy can still get hold of session keys using the long-term keys of compromised agents.
Modelling the Server
The server creates the list of certi cates according to another inductive de nition. It de nes not a set of traces but a set of triples (P; R; K) where P is a request, R is a response and K is a session key. Such triples belong to the set respond evs, where evs (the current trace) is supplied to prevent the reuse of old session keys. Component K returns the newest session key to the caller for inclusion in a second certi cate. The occurrences of Hash in the de nition ensure that the server accepts requests only if he can verify the hashes using his knowledge of the long-term keys. The inductive de nition (Fig. 6) In secrecy theorems (those expressed in terms of analz), each occurrence of Crypt can cause a case split, resulting in a substantial blowup after simplication. Induction over responses introduces only one Crypt, but induction over respond introduces three. Because responses includes invalid outputs, some theorems can only be proved for respond.
Main Results Proved
For the most part, the analysis resembles that of the Otway-Rees protocol. Possibility properties are proved rst, then regularity lemmas. Secrecy theorems govern the use of session keys, leading to the session key secrecy theorem: if the certi cate Crypt(shrK A)fjKab; B; Naj g appears as part of any tra c, where A and B are uncompromised, then Kab will never reach the spy. Another theorem guarantees that such certi cates originate only with the server.
Possibility properties are logically trivial. All they tell us is that the rules' message formats are compatible. However, their machine proofs require signi cant e ort (or computation) due to the complexity of the terms that arise and the number of choices available. I proved cases corresponding to runs with up to three agents plus the server and spy. General theorems for n agents could be proved by induction on n, but the necessary e ort hardly seems justi ed.
A typical regularity lemma states that the long-term keys of uncompromised agents never form part of any message. They do form part of hashed messages, however; recall the discussion in x3.2 above.
Security properties are proved, as always, by induction over the protocol de nition. For this protocol, the main inductive set (recur) is de ned in terms of another (respond). All but the most trivial proofs require induction over both de nitions.
An easily-proved result lets us reduce responses to respond, justifying the use of induction over responses:
(P a; Rb; Kab) 2 respond evs Rb 2 responses evs
Most results are no harder to prove than for a xed-length protocol. Proving a theorem requires four commands on average, of which two are quite predictable: induction and simpli cation. The outer induction yields six subgoals: one for each protocol step, plus the base and fake cases. The inner induction replaces the step 3 case by two subgoals: the server's base case and inductive step. Few of these seven subgoals survive simpli cation. Only the theorems described below have di cult proofs.
Nonces generated in requests are unique. There can be at most one hashed value containing the key of an uncompromised agent (A 6 2 bad) and any speci ed nonce value, Na. 9B 0 P 0 : 8B P: HashfjKey(shrK A); Agent A; Agent B; Na; Pj g 2 parts(spies evs) ?! B = B 0^P = P 0 :
Although it is not used in later proofs, this theorem is important. It lets agents identify runs by their nonces. The theorem applies to all requests, whether generated in step 1 or step 2. For the Otway-Rees protocol, each of the two steps requires its own theorem. The reasoning here is similar, but one theorem does the work of two, thanks to the protocol's symmetry. The nesting of requests does not a ect the reasoning. The session key compromise theorem is formulated just as for OtwayRees (see x4.5), but its proof is much more di cult. The inner induction over respond leads to excessive case splits. It was to simplify this proof that I de ned the set responses.
Unicity for session keys is unusually complicated because each key appears in two certi cates. Moreover, the certi cates are created in di erent iterations of respond. The This theorem seems quite strong. An agent who receives a certi cate immediately learns which other agent can receive its mate, subject to the security of both agents' long-term keys. One might hope that the session key secrecy theorem would follow without further ado. The only messages containing session keys contain them as part of such certi cates, and thus the keys are safe from the spy. But such reasoning amounts to another induction over all possible messages in the protocol. The theorem must be stated (stipulating A, A 0 6 2 bad) and proved:
Crypt(shrK A)fjKey K; Agent A 0 ; Nj g 2 parts(spies evs) ?! Key K 6 2 analz(spies evs)
The induction is largely straightforward except for the step 3 case. The inner induction over respond leads to such complications that it must be proved beforehand as a lemma. If (P B; RB; Kab) 2 respond evs then 8A A 0 N: A 6 2 bad^A 0 6 2 bad ?! Crypt(shrK A)fjKey K; Agent A 0 ; Nj g 2 partsfRBg ?! Key K 6 2 analz(fRBg spies evs)
Although each session key appears in two certi cates, they both have the same format. A single set of proofs applies to all certi cates. Once again, the protocol's symmetry halves the e ort compared with Otway-Rees.
It may be instructive to see some theorems in Isabelle syntax. Here is the session key compromise theorem: | evs 2 recur; KAB 6 2 range shrK |] =) (Key K 2 analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs))) = (K = KAB _ Key K 2 analz (spies evs))
And here is the session key secrecy theorem:
| Crypt (shrK A) {|Key K, Agent A', N|} 2 parts (spies evs); A 6 2 bad; A' 6 2 bad; evs 2 recur |] =) Key K 6 2 analz (spies evs)
Potential Attacks
All proofs are subject to the assumptions implicit in the model. Attacks against the protocol or implementations of it can still be expected. Onè attack' is obvious: in step 2, agent B does not know whether A's message is recent; at the conclusion of the run, B still has no evidence that A is present. The spy can masquerade as A by replaying an old message of hers, but cannot read the resulting certi cate without her long-term key.
Allowing type confusion (such as passing a nonce as a key) often admits attacks 27, 29] in which one form of certi cate is mistaken for another. The recursive authentication protocol is safe from such attacks because it has only one form of certi cate. However, encryption must be secure.
In the original protocol, each session key was encrypted by forming its XOR with a hash value, used as a one-time pad. Unfortunately, each hash value was used twice: B's session keys Kab 
Related Work
Several other researchers are using inductive or trace models. Veri cation is done using general-purpose theorem provers or model checkers, or by hand. In early work, Kemmerer 23] analyzed a protocol in the Ina Jo speci cation language, which is based on rst-order logic. Using an animation tool, he identi ed two weaknesses in the protocol. He modelled the system as an automaton, de ning the initial state and the state transformations, and specifying security goals as invariants. Proving that state transformations preserve an invariant is the same style of reasoning as induction. Gray and McLean 19] also establish a security invariant by induction, though their work is based on temporal logic and their proofs are done by hand. many errors in them. Bryans and Schneider 8] have proved some simple properties for a single run of the recursive authentication protocol.
Schneider has considered the consequences of allowing messages to satisfy equational laws on messages. Many protocols|and attacks!|exploit algebraic properties of encryption method, particularly RSA 38].
Conclusions
The inductive method is simple and general. We have seen how it handles three versions of Otway-Rees, two versions of Needham-Schroeder (with public keys), and a recursive protocol. The analysis of Needham-Schroeder reveals Lowe's attack, and I have discovered a new attack in a variant of Otway-Rees. In addition to the protocols discussed above, I have analyzed two variants of Yahalom 36], a simpli ed version of Woo-Lam 1] and the shared-key version of Needham-Schroeder. Bella and I have looked at Kerberos, which is based on timestamps; its use of session keys to encrypt other keys complicates its analysis 4]. I have modelled part of the Internet protocol TLS 15, 35] in which secret nonces are exchanged, then used to compute session keys.
Proofs are highly automated. One Isabelle command can generate thousands of inferences. Small changes to protocols involve only small changes to proof scripts. 4 Analyzing Needham-Schroeder took only 30 hours of my time, the recursive protocol two weeks. These gures include time spent extending the model with public-key encryption and hashing. Adherence to design principles such as explicitness 1] simpli es proofs.
Model checking is an e ective means of nding attacks 24, 25, 26] , but it cannot replace theorem proving. It copes with only nitely many states, and the failure to nd an attack says nothing about how a protocol works.
An inductive proof is a symbolic examination of the protocol. Each step is analyzed in turn. The reasoning can be explained informally, letting us understand how the protocol copes with various circumstances. When a protocol is modi ed, the proof scripts for the old version form the starting point for its analysis. These scripts take only a few minutes to run, which is competitive with model checking.
The two methods complement each other. A protocol designer might use model checking for a quick inspection and apply the inductive approach to investigate deeper properties.
Formal methods cannot guarantee security. Theorems can easily be mis- The attack on the recursive protocol 41] is a sobering reminder of the limitations of formal methods. Models idealize the real world: here, by assuming strong encryption. Making the model more detailed makes reasoning harder and, eventually, infeasible. A compositional approach seems necessary: di erent levels of abstraction, such as protocol messages, cryptographic algorithms, and transport protocols, should be veri ed separately. Devising such an approach will be a challenge.
